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“thrEE strikEs” sEntEncing: 
anothEr BloW for Mäori
By WaynE ruMBlEs
On June 1, 2010 the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010 amended the Sentencing Act and 
introduced into New Zealand the so-called “three strikes” sentencing regime.1
The rationale for introducing this sentencing regime was that it would protect the public, deter 
offenders, and improve public confidence in the criminal justice system.2 The stated purpose of 
the Act is:3
•	 To deny parole to certain repeat offender and to offenders guilty of the worst murders.
•	 Impose maximum terms of imprisonment on persistent repeat offenders who continue to commit seri-
ous violent offences.
This legislative comment will argue that this regime will disproportionately impact on Mäori who 
are already over represented in the criminal justice system at every level. The Department of Cor-
rections has reaffirmed that amplification of Mäori within the system is at least in part due to sys-
temic factors that operate at one or more steps of the criminal justice process which make it more 
likely for Mäori to be apprehended, arrested, charged, convicted or imprisoned, with the result 
that Mäori “accumulate” in the system in greater numbers.4 Given that there is some systematic 
bias discernable around Mäori in the criminal justice system, any habitual offender-sentencing re-
gime will disproportionately impact on Mäori, feeding a cycle of increasing Mäori incarceration. 
This comment argues that application of this amendment without first addressing the systematic 
bias toward Mäori in the criminal justice system is unjust. Brookbanks and Ekins have produced 
a through and excellent critique of the “three strikes” regime which details strong arguments as to 
why the law is unjust, while I fully support the findings of their article, I am not going to repeat 
their critique, but rather add another possible reason why the “three strikes” regime is unjust and 
should be repealed or amended as Brookbanks and Ekins suggest.5
* Senior Lecturer, Te Piringa – Faculty of Law, University of Waikato. I would like to thank Gay Morgan for her criti-
cal thinking and helpful comments.
1 For a discussion of the introduction of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act see Waren Brookbanks and Richard 
Ekins “ The Case Against the “Three Strikes” Sentencing Regime” (2010) 4 NZ Law Review 689 at 690. 
2 Law and Order Committee, Full Report “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill” (26 March 2010), 1; see also J Collins, 
“National and ACT agree to three-strikes regime” 19 January 2010 <www.beehive.govt.nz/release/national-and-act-
agree-three-strikes-regime>; Rodney Hide and David Garrett, “Three Strikes Policy. The Sentencing and Parole Re-
form Bill,” (Auckland: ACT Party, 2010) <www.act.org.nz/files/features/three-strikes.pdf>. 
3 Section 3 of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010.
4 See Department of Corrections “Over-representation of Mäori in the Criminal Justice System :An exploratory report, 
(Policy, Strategy and Research Group Department of Corrections September 2007) especially Part 2 “ Criminal Jus-
tice Bias and Accumulation.”
5 See generally Brookbanks and Ekins, above n 1. 
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i. thE thrEE strikEs lEgislation
In the 2008 National-Act Confidence and Supply Agreement, the National Government agreed to 
support the introduction of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill.6 This Bill proceeded through 
the house and was duly enacted as the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010. It inserts sections 
86A-86I into the Sentencing Act 2002.7 Theses reformed sections apply to 40 offences, which are 
considered to be serious violent offences,8 with special provisions for murder and manslaughter.9 
The trigger for application of the “three strike” regime is a conviction of a qualifying offence, re-
gardless of seriousness or level of sentence.10
A. Strike One
When a defendant is convicted of a qualifying offence for the first time, the Court must warn the 
offender of the consequences of the offender being convicted of any further qualifying offences.11 
This section of the “three strike” sentencing regime contains no particular sentencing directives, 
so normal sentencing consideration would apply.
B. Strike Two
If an offender goes on to commit another qualifying offence after receiving a first warning, the 
Judge must issue a final a warning which includes the consequences that will follow if the of-
fender is convicted of any further qualifying offences.12 In addition to this warning any custodial 
sentence imposed for the second strike offence must be served in full, without parole. The sen-
tencing Judge has no discretion in terms of non-parole.13
C. Strike Three
If offender is convicted of a qualifying offence committed after the second and final warning, hav-
ing thus committed three qualifying offences they must then be sentenced in the High Court. The 
sentencing Judge must sentence the offender to the maximum term of imprisonment specified for 
the offence, and has no discretion in that regard.14 In addition to imposing the maximum sentence 
being prescribed, the Court must also order that the offence is served without parole.15 In this re-
gard, the sentencing Judge does have discretion. The sentencing Judge is not required to order the 
6 “National-Act Confidence and Supply Agreement” (16 November 2008) <www.act.org.nz/files/agreement.pdf>.
7 Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010, s 6.
8 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86A includes: robbery, aggravated burglary, assault with intent to rob, wounding with intent 
to cause grievous bodily harm, wounding with intent to injure murder, manslaughter, rape, indecent assault. 
9 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86E.
10 Some of the offences listed under s 86A can range from relatively minor that may normally attract a custodial sen-
tence to the serious violent offences. Under normal sentencing this range can be accommodated by the discretion of 
the sentencing Judge. 
11 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86B, the Court must also give a written warning, the offender must be over 18 years of age 
and the offence must have been committed after the legislation came into force. See s 12 of the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Act 2010. 
12 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86C(1).
13 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86C(4).
14 Or each offence if there is more than one. Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D(2).
15 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D(3).
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sentence be served without parole if satisfied that ‘it would be manifestly unjust to make [such an] 
order”.16
Although “manifestly unjust” is not defined in the Sentencing Act, it has been interpreted to be a 
high threshold elsewhere in our sentencing law.17
There are special provisions that apply if manslaughter is the third strike conviction. In this the 
case, the Court must impose a life sentence, however it is not required to order the life sentence to 
be served without parole. The Act requires a minimum non-parole period of imprisonment of 20 
year unless the Court considers 20 years imprisonment to be ‘manifestly unjust’. If that is found to 
be the case, the Court must set a 10 minimum non-parole period.18
In the case of murder at the second or third strike stage, the Court must sentence the offender 
to life imprisonment without parole, again, unless the Court is satisfied that it would be ‘mani-
festly unjust’ to do so. If the Court does deem that life imprisonment without parole would be 
‘manifestly unjust’, then whether the murder conviction has come as a second or a third strike 
becomes relevant.
In a second strike murder conviction, the Court can apply the normal murder sentencing; either 
a minimum 10 years non-parole period19 or, if certain aggravating factors were present, a 17 years 
non-parole period.20 In the case of a strike three murder, if life imprisonment without parole has 
been deemed ‘manifestly unjust’, the Court must then order a 20 year non-parole period unless it 
deems that that also would be ‘manifestly unjust’. If so, it can then apply either the10 or the 17 
year minimum non-parole periods as explained above.
ii. Mäori accuMulation in thE criMinal JusticE systEM
There have been a number of empirical studies of the experiences of Mäori with the colonial 
criminal justice system. Simone Bull’s study of Mäori and crime in New Zealand from 1853-1919 
concludes that early Mäori offending could be explained by the ongoing process of colonisation 
and by a need to project an illusion of state control.21 She views the early phase (prior to 1911) 
of Mäori offending as primarily cultural conflicts,22 added to over-policing of Mäori alcohol con-
sumption to placate Pakeha and specific instances of the criminalization of Mäori Independence 
movements ( mid 1860s, 1881 and 1897).23
16 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D(3). 
17 See s 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002 regarding the presumption in favour of life imprisonment for murder to be 
rebutted where life imprisonment would be “manifestly unjust.” See R v Williams & Olsen [2005] 2 NZLR 506 (CA). 
The high threshold of the term “manifestly unjust” is also discussed in terms of departure from life imprisonment See 
R v Rawiri (HC, Auckland T 014047, 16 September 2002, Fisher J). 
18 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D(4).
19 Sentencing Act 2002 s 103. 
20 Sentencing Act 2002 s 104.
21 Wayne Rumbles “Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process: New Relationship or New Mask?” in Greg Ratcliffe and 
Gerry Turcotte Compr(om)ising Post/colonilaim(s) (Dangaroo Press, Sydney, 2001) 225 at 225-226. 
22 These included a small number of charged for fishing without a licence, breaches of Cemeteries Act and the Tohunga 
Suppression Act 1907. See Simone Bull “The Land of Murder, Cannibalism and all Kinds of Atrocious Crimes?” 
Mäori and Crime in New Zealand 1853-1919 (July 2004) 44(4) The British Journal of Criminology, 496 at 505. 
23 1860s Waikato Wars, Pai Marire and the criminalization of rebellion, 1879-1882 Parihaka, and 1890s Dog tax and 
1897 Parihaka revisted. Bull, above n 22, at 506-510. 
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However between 1906 and 1911, a 130 per cent increase in the number of charges laid against 
Mäori defendants occurred. This can be explained in part as a second wave of Pakeha focus on 
Mäori and alcohol. However much of the rise in Mäori prosecutions can also be tied to a prevalent 
focus on “law and order” after New Zealand’s 1907 attainment of dominion status. New Zealand 
was a new and geographically isolated dominion with emerging political structures, which were 
still unstable. Bull argues that policing was necessarily focused towards those who, by class or by 
race, were perceived as actual or potential threats to the state-centred concepts of order and regu-
larity. Therefore with a view to state control, legislation was used to facilitate the over–policing of 
Mäori. The focus on Mäori offending meant that reported offending statistics increased, setting up 
a cycle of focusing on the “Mäori” criminal problem, which increased reporting of Mäori crime, 
thus justifying the need for further official intervention, with the deeper concern being linked to 
the new dominion’s focus on state control and law and order. This cycle set up a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, which still is manifest today.24
There are many other contributing factors to this accumulation of Mäori in the criminal justice 
system. The effects of colonisation through cultural marginalisation and the undermining of the 
existent traditional Mäori legal system ought not be underestimated as ongoing contributors to 
the high numbers of Mäori in the criminal justice system.25 Negative socio-economic factors and 
negative early life experiences have a criminogenic effect on all people. Unfortunately Mäori dis-
proportionately find themselves subject to those circumstances.26
A. The Systemic Biases of the Cycle
I will now focus on a number of systematic factors at work in the justice system itself which 
aggravate the historical and socioeconomic/psychological factors just discussed, and which are 
likely to exacerbate the injustices to Mäori, adding injustice inflicted by the likely disproportional 
application of the “three strikes” regime. This amplification explanation posits that, whatever the 
real rate of criminal behaviour, any crime committed (or indeed suspected) is subject to systemic 
processes that make it more likely that Mäori will be apprehended, and then will be dealt with 
more severely. These processes have variously been described as “unintended consequences of 
discretion”, “unevenness of decision-making”, “bias” and “institutional racism”.27
Each stage of the criminal justice system has significant inbuilt discretion. The Police have 
significant discretion. That discretion ranges from whether to investigate a particular complaint of 
criminal offending through from what process to follow for the apprehension of suspects, whether 
or not a arrest will be made, whether an arrest will proceed to prosecution and, in many cases in-
cluding, to what charges will be laid.28 After prosecution the Court may or may not convict, and 
once convicted the sentencing Judge has discretion as to which sentencing options are suitable.
24 Ibid, at 516-17.
25 Khylee Quince “Mäori and the Criminal Justice System in New Zealand” in Julia Tolmie and Warren Brookbanks 
(eds) The New Zealand Criminal Justice System (LexisNexis, Auckland, 2007) at 9-13, R Ranganui Walker Ka 
Whawhau Tonu Matou (2nd Ed, Auckland: Penguin Books, 2004).
26 Ministry of Justice “Social Risk Factors for the involvement in Crime” Strategic Policy Brief (Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington March 2009) and Ministry of Justice “Mäori at Risk of Crime: Some Factors” Strategic Policy Brief 
(Ministry of Justice, Wellington April 2009). 
27 Department of Corrections, above n 4, at 7. 
28 Crown Law Prosecution Guidelines (Crown Law, Wellington, 1 January 2010).
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Although Mäori make up approximately 15 per cent of the New Zealand population,29 the 
crime statistics reflect a disproportionality that cannot easily be explained.
Mäori are more likely to apprehended for a criminal offence and more likely to be prosecuted 
than non-Mäori, and Maori are nine times more likely to be remanded in custody while awaiting 
trial.30 Mäori account for 41 per cent of all accused offenders,31 44 per cent of all convictions, 46 
per cent of violent convicted offences, 47 per cent of property convicted offences and 41 per cent 
of all convicted drug offences. Mäori are nearly three times more likely to be convicted of crimi-
nal offences than non-Mäori,32 receiving 53 per cent of all custodial sentences and 50 per cent of 
periodic detention – but only 35 per cent of monetary sentences.33
New Zealand’s imprisonment rate is high compared to similar countries with a rate of 199 per 
100,000 (as at June 2010).34 England and Wales have a rate of 152/100,000, Australia has a rate of 
134/100,000 and Canada a rate of 117/100,000. Countries that have similar rates of imprisonment 
to New Zealand include Namibia 194/100,000, Costa Rica 198/100,000, Mexico 207/100,000, 
Uruguay 193/100,000 and Malaysia 192/100,000.35 New Zealand is out ranked in terms of impris-
onment rate by the United States of America with the highest prison population rate in the world 
of 748 per 100,000.36 The United States of America is often criticised as being out on its own 
imprisonment trajectory of harsh and exclusionary justice.37 However if Mäori are considered in 
isolation from the rest of the New Zealand population, their imprisonment rate is already about 
700/100,000 or on a par with the United States’ astonishing statistics. If the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Act 2010 does increase the accumulation of Mäori in the prisons, the rate of Mäori im-
prisonment may well approach that of or even exceed that of the United States.38
This accumulation of Mäori in the Criminal Justice system results in Mäori making up 51 per 
cent of the prison population is not new and a body of research has developed particularly since 
the 1970s in an attempt to explain the disparities.39 There are several ways that apprehension rates 
29 National Ethnic Population Projections: 2006 (base)–2026 update (Statistics New Zealand, 2010).
30 Quince, above n 25, at 1-3.
31 “Crime in New Zealand A Statistical Profile: Statistics” Information Briefing for members of Parliament (Parliamen-
tary Library, 2000) at 9.
32 “Gaps between Ethic Groups: Some Key Statistics” Information Briefing for Members of Parliament (Parliamentary 
Library, 2000). 
33 Crime in New Zealand, above n 31, at 9.
34 This is the sixth highest rate of imprisonment in the OECD and the 60th highest rate in the world. Prison facts and 
statistics – September 2010 (Department of Corrections) <www.corrections.govt.nz/about-us/facts_and_statistics/
prisons/march_2012.html>. Note prison statistics change daily but general the imprison rate and percentage of Mäori 
inmates remains fairly constant over time. 
35 Roy Walmsley “World Prison Population List (8th edition, King’s College International Centre for Prison Studies 
London, 2009). 
36 Prison facts and statistics - September 2010 (Department of Corrections) <www.corrections.govt.nz/about-us/facts_
and_statistics/prisons/march_2012.html>. 
37 See Nicola Lacey, “Criminal Justice and Democratic Systems: Inclusionary and Exclusionary Dynamics in the Insti-
tutional Structure of Late Modern Societies” (Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #148, 2007) at 9-11.
38 National Health Committee “Health in Justice: Kia Piki te Ora, Kia Tika! – Improving the health of prisoners and 
their families and whänau: He whakapiki i te ora o ngä mauhere me ö rätou whänau” (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 
2010) at 22. 
39 See for example L Duncan “Explanations for Polynesian Crime Rates in Auckland” (October 1971) Recent Law at 
283-288; Moana Jackson, The Mäori and the Criminal Justice System: He Whaipaanga Hou – A New Perspective, 
Part 2 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1988); Quince, above n 25, and Bull, above n 22. 
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may be amplified, and while each may only have a small impact on its own, their cumulative 
and compounding effects significantly contribution to Maori accumulation in the criminal justice 
system.
A considerable number of arrests do follow from police stopping and questioning citizens in 
public places. There is evidence that Mäori are more susceptible to police stopping and check-
ing.40 Police do engage in profiling both explicitly and implicitly (even unconsciously) as an aid 
to crime prevention. Given New Zealand’s crime statistics and the position of Mäori in those sta-
tistics, ethnicity appears to be a salient characteristic for police inquiry. This will undoubtedly be 
reinforced by past experience.41
Although racial profiling is a controversial subject for law enforcement and has been denied as 
being attributable to the New Zealand Police environment,42 nevertheless, a number of studies in 
counties with similar disproportionate crime statistics for certain sub-groups ethnic find profiling 
has been a factor. 43 It is likely that some from of racial profiling is impacting on apprehension 
discretion. Maxwell and Smith’s report on police perceptions of Mäori clearly showed some ele-
ments of ethnicity based profiling by the New Zealand police.44
Wortley and Tanner describe racial profiling existing:45
...when the members of certain racial or ethnic groups become subject to greater levels of criminal justice 
surveillance than others. Racial profiling, therefore, is typically defined as a racial disparity in police stop 
and search practices…increased police patrols in racial minority neighbourhoods and undercover activi-
ties or sting operations which selectively target particular ethnic groups.
Maxwell and Smith illustrated that the many Police officers were more likely to carry out a rou-
tine vehicle stop of a known offender if they were Mäori, more likely to ask what a Mäori person 
is doing if seen out in the small hours of the morning, and most significantly, much more likely to 
suspect a Mäori of an offence or carry out a vehicular stop if a Mäori is driving a “flash” car.46 It 
is clear the ethnicity based profiling does not explain the whole of the extent of apprehension dis-
parity – other possible factors may be the dualistic stereotyping of police about Mäori and Mäori 
about police.47
Through these stereotypes police are more likely to suspect Mäori of offending and Mäori are 
more likely to distrust the police, believing any negative response to be racism. This helps cre-
40 Maxwell and Smith, above n 44, at 15. 
41 Department of Corrections, above n 4, at 15.
42 “Police Complaints Authority response to Mäori Party complaint about Police use of Tasers” (3 April 2007) 638 
NZPD 8574. 
43 See for example Candice Batton and Colleen Kadleck “Theoretical and methodological issues in racial profiling Re-
search” (2004) 7(1) Police Quarterly at 30-64, Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips Racism, Crime and Justice (London: 
Longman, 2002), Robin Engel, Jennifer Calnan, and Thomas Bernard “Theory and racial profiling: Shortcomings 
and future directions in research” (2002) 19 Justice Quarterly at 249-273, and Lorie Fridell, Robert Lunney and Drew 
Diamond “Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response” (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 
2002). 
44 Gabrielle Maxwell and Catherine Smith, “Police Perceptions of Mäori: A Report to the New Zealand Police and the 
Ministry of Mäori Development: Te Puni Kokiri” (Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington 1998). 
45 S Wortley and J Tanner “Inflammatory Rhetoric? Baseless Accusations? A Response to Gabor’s Critique of Racial 
Profiling Research in Canada” Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice (2005) at 581-583. 
46 Maxwell and Smith, above n 44, at 11-16. 
47 See Gabrielle Maxwell “Police and Mäori: Perceptions of One Another”. Paper presented at Ngakia Kia Puwai, 
Auckland, 2005.
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ate a self-perpetuating and self-fulfilling cycle, as both groups have negative expectations of the 
interaction. This means that Police may have a heightened response to any suspicious behaviour 
of Mäori, and Mäori, through distrust and the belief that police are biased, may respond uncoop-
eratively, which then in turn is further interpreted as suspicious.48 Even the Department of Cor-
rections acknowledges that apprehension rates do not simply reflect actual offending behaviour 
of persons in the community and acknowledge that some form of bias appears to be occurring.49
Following apprehension, a decision must be made to initiate a formal prosecution. As the 
“three strikes” sentencing regime is triggered by the initial conviction of qualifying offence, which 
charge is laid is crucial to the application of the regime. This sharply increases the significance of 
prosecutorial discretion and the risk of arbitrary and selective law enforcement.50
While overall apprehended Mäori are “moderately” more likely than non-Mäori to be 
prosecuted,51 the higher apprehension rate means proportionately more Mäori will be prosecuted. 
Mäori are more likely to convicted of qualifying offences than non-Mäori,52 and as only a qualify-
ing conviction (regardless of seriousness) is required, Mäori will be more likely to come under 
the regime. This is supported by a 21-year longitudinal study, which showed apparent bias in ar-
rest and conviction rates for Mäori relative to non-Mäori with similar backgrounds and offending 
history.53
The “Three Strikes” sentencing regime will only exacerbate the accumulation process outlined 
above and will disproportionately increase the number of Mäori in our prisons.
iii. haBitual offEndEr sEntEncing lEgislation in othEr Jurisdictions
New Zealand is not unique in applying habitual offender sentencing legislation.54 The application 
of those laws and their effect on certain ethnic groups within the society, tend to reinscribe the 
racial biases within criminal justice systems.
In the 1969 report Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections, The Canadian Law Re-
form Commission considered their habitual offender legislation. This legislation shared some of 
the elements of the New Zealand “three strikes” regime, namely that the strikes would only apply 
only after the offender was 18 years of age or older, and that there was no time restrictions to the 
qualifying offences.55 In other ways it was a much more measured regime. It effectively operated 
as four strike regime requiring three previous indictable offences for which the offender was li-
48 Department of Corrections, above n 4, at 16. 
49 Department of Corrections, above n 4, at 17. 
50 Brookbanks and Ekins above n 1, at 714-717. 
51 Department of Corrections, above n 4, at 20. 
52 Ministry of Justice “Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand 1995-2004” (Ministry of Justice, Wel-
lington , 2006). 
53 David Fergusson, John Horwood and Nicola Swain-Campbell “Ethnicity and Criminal Convictions: Results of a 21-
year Longitudinal Study” (2003) 36(3) The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 354 at 362-363. 
54 Twenty two States of the United States of America have some form of three strikes legislation, Most States of Aus-
tralia have some form of weaker habitual offender legislation. In Canada, the Habitual Offender Act dealt with mul-
tiple offences. The law was repealed after a Law Commission Report of 1969 found it to be erratically applied and 
that it was often used against non-violent and non-dangerous offenders. More recently there has been discussions as 
to whether to re-enact some form of habitual offender legislation in Canada. 
55 Compare the definition for Stage-1 offence in 86A of the Sentencing Act 2002 and ss 660-667 of The Criminal Code 
(Canada as at 31 March 1969). 
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able for five years (or more) imprisonment. This in effect introduces a seriousness threshold to 
the offences. The Canadian system required application to be made detailing previous conviction 
and evidence that the accused was “leading a persistently criminal life”.56 The applications were 
considered by a judge alone (without a jury), thus preserving judicial discretion in applying the 
increased sentencing for habitual offenders.57
However the Canadian Law Reform Commission recommended repeal of the habitual of-
fender sections and that they be replaced with what was in effect a preventative detention regime 
similar to one in the present New Zealand Sentencing Act.58 In their justifications for recommend-
ing repeal, the Commission noted that the application of the Habitual Offenders sentencing was 
inconsistent, discriminatory and any deterrent value was slight:59
Its discriminatory application against a few offenders, from among the large number of recidivists against 
whom the legislation might be applied, naturally results in bitterness and feelings of injustice among the 
… offenders against whom it has been applied
In studying the cases of offenders incarcerated under the habitual offender regime, the Commis-
sion noted that the regime had been primarily invoked for offences against property.60 Although 
the justification of the regime was to protect the public from the most dangerous offenders, in 
reality many of those incarcerated may have been a social nuisance but did not pose a grave threat 
to public safety.61
There are also numerous studies that demonstrate the disproportionate effect of California’s 
three strike legislation on African Americans and Latinos.62 Although the following words are 
referring to California’s three strike laws they resonate with our own regime in New Zealand.63
The [] inequality is in the race and ethnicity of people subject to the law. In the state as a whole and most 
localities in particular, minorities are treated more harshly at every stage of the system—beginning at ar-
rest and ending, for some of them, with a sentence under Three Strikes.
56 The Criminal Code (Canada as at 31 March 1969) s 660(2)(a).
57 It should be noted that this regime provided for preventive detention to be applied to habitual criminal offenders in 
lieu of any other sentence imposed. An application could be applied for up to three months after the sentence had 
been passed. 
58 See Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Canadian Law Reform Commission, Ottawa, 1969) at 258- 
261 which also included the repeal of the dangerous sexual offenders legislation and recommended that both of these 
be covered by a preventative detention regime (Dangerous Offenders Legislation). Eventual repeal and replacement 
of the section was not until 1977 but the Dangerous Offender Legislation was based on the 1969 report. See also 
John Howard Society “Dangerous Offender Legislation around the World” (1999) <www.johnhoward.ab.ca/pub/
C20.htm> and Sentencing Act 2002, ss 87-90.
59 Towards Unity, ibid.
60 Towards Unity, ibid, at 251.
61 Ibid, at 251- 252.
 On analysis the Commission came to the following conclusions:
•	Almost 40% of those incarcerated under the regime appear not to be a threat to the public
•	Perhaps 1/3 would appear to pose a serious threat
•	Substantial number where there was not enough evidence to warrant a conclusion that the posed a threat. 
62 See for example Elsa Chen “The Liberation Hypothesis and Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Application of Cali-
fornia’s Three Strikes Law” (2008) 6(2) Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice at 85 and 87-89; Lawrence Bobo and 
Victor Thompson “Racialized Mass Incarceration: Poverty, Prejudice, and Punishment” in Hazel Markus and Paula 
Moya (eds) Doing Race: 21 Essays for the 21st Century (Norton New York, 2010) at 322. 
63 Scott Ehlers, Vincent Schiraldi, and Eric Lotke “Racial Divide: An Examination of the Impact of California’s Three 
Strikes Law on African-Americans and Latinos” (Justice Police Institute, Washington, 2004) at 19. 
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Of course, the racial disparities in the criminal justice system are the result of many causes. Minority 
communities often experience higher rates of poverty or unemployment; individuals may have less mon-
ey and more trouble making bail or hiring private attorneys who can advocate on their behalf for better 
treatment under the law. However, the present system appears to exacerbate rather than ameliorate these 
underlying inequalities. Attention needs to be paid to ensure that the justice system of California reaches 
as near as possible to the aspiration of equal justice under law. The Three Strikes law, as it is currently 
structured, does not appear to be meeting that aspiration.
Mäori already feel alienated by a criminal justice system that is perceived as treating them 
unjustly,64 the “three strikes” sentencing regime is just another blow for Maori. Applying habitual 
offender sentencing legislation to a criminal justice system, which already has systematic bias to-
wards apprehending, prosecuting and convicting one social group within a society cannot lead to 
greater security for the public. While there are many other reasons why the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Act 2010 is bad law65 and should be repealed, I argue that the exacerbation of underlying 
inequalities in the criminal justice system is one of them. The Canadians recognised the injustice 
of this type of legislation in 1969. My hope is that here in New Zealand we also may see this 
legislation to be what it is, unjust, arbitrary and disproportionate, and that we will either repeal or 
extensively amend it.66
64 “Perspectives on Responding to the Over-Representation of Mäori in the Criminal Justice System. The Views of 
Mäori Stakeholders” (Justice Sector Policy Group, Ministry of Justice and the Social Policy Branch, Te Puni Kökiri, 
1998) at 9-10. A 1998 joint Te Puni Kökiri and Ministry of Justice study found Mäori feel alienated from Police 
and criminal justice agencies. Responses of the criminal justice system to offending were perceived as unhelpful for 
Mäori offenders in particular. By not effectively dealing with crime, the criminal justice system may actually contrib-
ute to re-offending. Some contributing factors noted include:
•	 the court system is meaningless to many Mäori;
•	poor quality legal advice to Mäori;
•	prosecution practices for Mäori differ from that of non-Mäori;
•	culturally inappropriate behaviour of lawyers, court staff, and the judiciary;
•	 inappropriate sentencing of Mäori offenders;
•	 ineffectiveness of imprisonment.
65 See Brookbanks Ekins, above n 1, generally.
66 Ibid, at 696-699.
